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CASES NOTED
TERRITORIAL FAIRNESS: A DUE PROCESS STANDARD
FOR QUASI IN REM JURISDICTION
A Kansas resident filed a complaint against an Illinois drug company
in a Mississippi court alleging that she had suffered a stroke as a result
of using the defendant's inadequately tested birth control pills which
she had purchased in Kansas. The defendant was incorporated in Dela-
ware, had its principal place of business in Illinois, and owned no tangible
property in Mississippi. The defendant did maintain three full-time
employees in Mississippi and sold several hundred thousand dollars worth
of its products annually to companies in that state. The plaintiff attempted
to establish jurisdiction by attachment' of debts owed to the defendant
by companies doing business in Mississippi. The defendant removed the
action2 to the federal district court where the complaint was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held, reversed and remanded: Mississippi law pro-
vides that where a nonresident plaintiff attaches debts owed to a foreign
corporate defendant, the court has quasi in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate
a tort claim arising outside of the state; there is no violation of due pro-
cess in the exercise of such jurisdiction where the defendant has suffi-
cient contact with the forum state so that the maintenance of the action
will not be unfair. Steele v. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1973).
For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, actions are characterized
as in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem.2 In personam jurisdiction is the
power of the court to impose a personal liability upon the defendant." In
rem jurisdiction is the power of the court to determine the interests of
all persons in specific property.5 Quasi in rem jurisdiction is the power
of the court to determine the interests of particular persons in specific
property. Quasi in rem actions are of two types: (1) actions which arise
from disputes concerning the rights of the parties to the property over
which the court has taken jurisdiction, and (2) actions to determine a
claim unrelated to the property, which is used as a device for obtaining
jurisdiction and as a fund for execution. 7 In Steele the court was con-
fronted with the latter type.
Prior to Steele, different due process tests were applied depending
1. The attachment action was brought pursuant to Miss. CODE A.N. §§ 1437, 5346
(1942), and Miss. CODE ANN. § 5309--230 (Supp. 1972), on the ground that the defendant
was doing business in Mississippi. The dismissal of the in personam action was not appealed.
2. The action was removed pursuant to 28 U.S*C. § 1441 (1970).
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upon whether the action was in personam or in rem. The basis upon which
state court jurisdiction could be predicated, within the limitations of
fourteenth amendment due process, was first outlined in 1877 in Pennoyer
v. Neff.' The Supreme Court indicated that in rem jurisdiction was based
on the physical presence of property within the forum state, and that in
personam jurisdiction was based either upon the consent of the defendant,
or upon service of process on the defendant while present within the
forum state. These bases, along with notice and opportunity to defend,
satisfied the requirements of due process with respect to the exercise of
the various types of state court jurisdiction.9
Since Pennoyer, the due process restrictions on a state's exercise of
in personam jurisdiction have been relaxed. In addition to presence and
consent, it has been held that a state court may validly exercise in per-
sonama jurisdiction on the basis of domicil;' 0 appearance;" perpetration
of a tort within the state; 12 commission of an act outside the state which
causes legally actionable effects within the state; 13 and the act of doing
business in the state. 4 In International Shoe Co. v. Washington,5 the
Court stated the rule of due process with respect to in personam juris-
diction:
[D] ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' 6
This "minimum contacts" test, as developed by subsequent case law, 17
is the due process standard which is presently applicable to in personam
jurisdiction over corporations as well as individuals.'
8. 95 U.S. 714 (1877) [hereinafter referred to as Pennoyer].
9. Id.
10. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
11. Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (appearance of plaintiff); York v. Texas, 137
U.S. 15 (1890) (appearance of defendant).
12. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
13. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); cf. Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
14. E.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
15. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
16. Id. at 316.
17. See generally Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) (solicitation
of new members by nonprofit organization satisfies "minimum contacts"); Perkins v. Ben-
guet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (where defendant's activities constitute sub-
stantial contacts with the forum state, the cause of action need not arise out of those activi-
ties); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 335 U.S. 220 (1957) (renewal of a single life
insurance policy and collection of premiums satisfies "minimum contacts" test); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958) (administration of an out of state trust, remittance of income
to the beneficiary in the forum state, and execution of powers of appointment by the bene-
ficiary do not satisfy "minimum contacts" test with respect to the trustee).
18. Prior to the "minimum contacts" test the Court had justified the exercise of state
court jurisdiction over foreign corporations under theories of presence, doing business, and
consent. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
CASES NOTED
The permissible bases of quasi in rem jurisdiction were expanded by
the Supreme Court in Harris v. Balk19 to encompass a state's territorial
power over intangible as well as tangible property located within the
forum state.20 In Harris, the Court stated that where a state statute
authorizes attachment of a debt, service of process upon the garnishee
found in the forum state confers quasi in rem jurisdiction upon the
court, provided the garnishee could be sued by his creditor in that
state.21 This principle has been held to apply also where the garnishee
is a corporation doing business in the forum state.2 Thus, prior to Steele,
there had developed a territorial test of due process for in rem jurisdic-
tion and a "minimum contacts" test of due process for in personam
jurisdiction.
The application of different standards of due process depending upon
whether an action was characterized as in personam or in rem was declared
by the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.23 to be an unnecessary constitutional inconsistency.
The Court rejected the distinctions between in rem, quasi in rem, and in
personam jurisdiction for the purposes of satisfying due process, stating
that
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution do not depend upon a classification for which the
standards are so elusive and confused generally and which,
being primarily for state courts to define, may and do vary from
state to state.
24
The Court proceeded to determine the jurisdictional issue on general
principles of due process.
The Mullane approach to the due process issue concerning state
court jurisdiction was adopted and expanded by the Supreme Court of
California in Atkinson v. Superior Court.5 In that case, the court applied
the "minimum contacts" test of due process in holding that it had
validly obtained quasi in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights of
the parties to a trust fund located in another state. This idea that the
"minimum contacts" test is relevant to determine whether due process
19. 198 U.S. 215 (1905) [hereinafter referred to as Harris].
20. The courts have experienced considerable difficulty in determining the physical ter-
ritorial location, or situs, of intangible property, a necessarily fictional concept. Incongruities
and unfair limitations resulting from arbitrary and conflicting rules fixing the location of
intangible property have led a number of writers to call for eliminating the situs concept
and replacing it with a fairness standard. E.g., Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?
37 TEXAs L. Rsv. 657 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]. See note 27 infra. In Harris,
however, the Court held that the situs of a debt is the location of the debtor. Harris v. Balk,
198 U.S. 215 (1905).
21. Id. at 222.
22. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906).
23. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Mullane].
24. Id. at 312.
25. 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom.,
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
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permits the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction and that the distinction
between in rem and in personam "has no bearing on the fairness12 0
of exercising such jurisdiction has gained widespread support among
scholars and commentators.27
Shortly after Atkinson was decided, however, the United States
Supreme Court reiterated the territorial standard of due process and
relied on the in rem-quasi in rem-in personam distinctions in deter-
mining the constitutionality of state court jurisdiction in Hanson v.
Denckla.28 The Court held, on facts similar to those of Atkinson, that
despite numerous contacts between the forum state and the parties,
there could be no quasi in rem jurisdiction over a trust fund located in
another state.
The significance of the territorial standard of due process was
reaffirmed in Minichiello v. Rosenberg," where the court held, in reliance
on Harris, that a New York court had validly obtained quasi in rem
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in order to litigate a tort
claim arising outside of the state, by attachment of a "debt," the obliga-
tion of the defendant's liability insurer. In Minichiello, however, it was
pointed out that the holding applied only to actions brought by residents
of the forum state. 0 It was specifically determined that a quasi in rem
action based on a foreign claim could not be maintained by a nonresident
plaintiff against a nonresident defendant in Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation,
Inc 1 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit indicated
that to permit a nonresident to maintain such an action would raise
"exceedingly serious" constitutional doubts. 2
26. Id. at 346, 316 P.2d at 965.
27. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §§ 65, 68, comment c (1971);
Seldelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq.: The Urge Toward Reason and the Irrational Ratio
Deddendi, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 42 (1970); Traynor, supra note 20; von Mehren &
Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate, 79 HAiv. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 909 (1960) [hereinafter cited as State
Court Jurisdiction]; Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the
Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLux. L. REv. 550 (1967); Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in
Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 300 (1970);
Comment, Adjudication of Personal Rights by Proceedings Quasi in Rem, 10 STAN. L. R v.
750 (1958); Note, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 637 (1958); Note, 43 ST. JouN's L. REV. 58 (1968).
This position was most emphatically advanced by Justice Traynor:
It is time we had done with mechanical distinctions between in rem and in per-
sonam, high time now in a mobile society where property increasingly becomes
intangible and the fictional res becomes stranger and stranger. Insofar as courts
remain given to asking "Res, res-who's got the res?," they cripple their evaluation
of the real factors that should determine jurisdiction. They cannot evaluate the real
factors squarely until they give up the ghost of the res.
Traynor, supra note 20, at 663.
28. 357 U.S. 235 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Hanson].
29. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969) [hereinafter referred
to as Minichiello].
30. Id. at 110 n.6. Id. at 119 (concurring opinion).
31. 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969) [hereinafter referred to as Farrell].
32. Id. at 817. While the court decided the issue on the basis of state public policy and,
therefore, did not reach the federal constitutional issue, it characterized the above quoted
dicta as "understatement."
CASES NOTED
In resolving the Steele case, the Fifth Circuit was faced with an
apparent dilemma as to the proper due process standard applicable to
the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction by a state court. On the one
hand, the court was bound by the authority of Harris as reinforced by
Hanson and Minichiello. On the other hand, it could not ignore the
compelling reasoning of Mullane that fair play and substantial justice
do not depend on whether an action may be labelled in personam or quasi
in rem. In resolving this conflict the court purported to apply both the
territorial and the minimum contacts due process tests. In finding that
both had been satisfied it avoided any definitive rejection of either stan-
dard.
Clearly, the territorial requirements of Harris and Hanson had been
satisfied; there had been service of process upon the garnishees doing
business' in the forum state, and the garnishees could have been sued
by their creditor in that state. Yet the court went on to disapprove the
harsh rule of Harris, stating:
[W]ere we faced today with a case like the Harris v. Balk
of old, in which a defendant's debtor wanders across a border
line and thereby subjects the defendant to the process of a
strange and distant state, the tendency to call a halt would be
strong
4
Since the principles of state territorial power, outlined in Pennoyer and
reaffirmed in Harris and Hanson, could not be disregarded, they were
considered in applying the "minimum contacts" test. Thus, the court
stated that the presence of the defendant's debtor within the forum state
provides "a crucial point of contact [that] goes far toward providing
the essential 'minimum' necessary for the constitutional assumption of
jurisdiction."35 Once this was established, the further contacts necessary
to fulfill the "minimum" required were easily found to exist in that the
defendant maintained employees within the state and shipped several
hundred thousand dollars worth of merchandise into the state annually.
If the court had merely wished to adhere to the old rule of Harris,
it would not have been necessary to extend the opinion beyond a mea-
surement of the facts against that standard. By questioning Harris and
proceeding to measure the facts against a "minimum contacts" test based
on principles of fairness as well as territoriality, the court developed a
new due process standard applicable to quasi in rem jurisdiction. That
test requires not only the presence of intangible property in the forum
state, but also some additional contact between the defendant and that
forum such that the maintenance of the suit will not be unfair.
In applying the tests of due process, the Steele court noted that to
allow a nonresident plaintiff to sue a nonresident defendant on a foreign
33. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
34. 483 F.2d at 349.
35. Id. at 348.
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claim was constitutionally permissible. In light of Minichiello and
Farrell, which indicated that maintenance of such an action by a non-
resident would be constitutionally impermissible, the decision in the
instant case is questionable.
In Steele, the court treated the United States Supreme Court de-
cision in Ownbey v. Morgan" as authority preventing disallowance
of an action on the basis of nonresidence of the plaintiff. The court
quoted the following language from Ownbey:
[I]t is clear that, by virtue of the "privileges and immunities"
clause of section 2 of article 4 of the Constitution, each state is
at liberty, if not under duty, to accord the same privilege of pro-
tection to creditors who are citizens of other states that it
accords to its own citizens.8
7
Although a state may not discriminate on the basis of citizenship as to
who may have access to its courts, it may discriminate on the basis of
residence.18 Therefore, if it were found that, because of a plaintiff's
nonresidence, a quasi in rem action against a foreign corporation based
upon a foreign claim would violate due process as indicated in Minichiello
and Farrell, the action could be disallowed on due process grounds, and
the privileges and immunities clause of the Constitution would not pre-
vent such disallowance.
In addition to possible conflict with the views of the Second Circuit, 9
there also remain unresolved issues concerning the situs of intangible
property,4" the availability of a limited appearance,4 and the applicable
36. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
37. 483 F.2d at 346, quoting Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 109 (1921).
38. While it has been held that in distribution of a debtor's assets a state may not
discriminate against nonresident creditors by giving resident creditors priority, Blake v.
McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898), it is settled that a state may validly employ a distinction of
privileges according to residence where the distinction is supported by rational considerations.
Douglas v. New Haven R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). Thus, a state licensing statute granting
licenses only to resident insurance salesmen is valid, La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S.
465 (1919), and under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a state court may validly
refuse to take jurisdiction of a case brought against a foreign corporation by a nonresident,
even though it can not refuse such an action brought by a resident. Douglas v. New Haven
R.R., supra. It is submitted that since the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Con-
stitution does not prevent exclusion of nonresidents under the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, a fortiori, it should not prevent exclusion of nonresidents under the fourteenth
amendment.
39. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
844 (1969) ; Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969).
40. See note 20 supra.
41. In Steele, the court dismissed the issue of notice and opportunity to appear and to
be heard in a footnote. 483 F.2d at 341 n.4. Under the Mississippi attachment statute,
however, if the defendant defends on the merits, he is subject to a personal judgment for the
balance of the plaintiff's claim not realized by the sale of the attached property. John E. Hall
Comm'n Co. v. Foote, 90 Miss. 422, 43 So. 676 (1907). This procedure, which conditions
the due process right to be heard upon the surrender of the right of immunity from in
personam jurisdiction in a foreign tribunal, is highly questionable on constitutional grounds.
See State Court Jurisdiction, supra note 27, at 953-55. In Steele, however, since the value
CASES NOTED
substantive law and statute of limitations.4" Nevertheless, the Steele
case reflects an ingenious solution to the problem presented by incon-
sistent standards of due process applicable to the exercise of state court
jurisdiction. By adding a fairness requirement to the territorial require-
ments of Harris and Hanson, the court utilized apparently conflicting
precedents to synthesize a new rule of due process. Without abandoning
basic principles of state territorial sovereignty, this new rule for quasi
in rem jurisdiction marks a significant step toward a standard which




Decedent and his wife transferred appreciated stock in two closely
held corporations to their children and respective spouses who in ex-
change, promised to make monthly annuity payments to decedent and
his wife for their joint lives. As security for the payments, the stock was
placed in escrow and a cognovit note was executed which provided for
judgment against the children in case of non-payment. Payments were
received in 1968 and 1969 pursuant to the annuity agreement. The
annuitants treated these payments as a return of their investment and
paid no federal income tax on them. The Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue determined deficiencies in the annuitants' federal income taxes for
1968 and 1969, treating the annuity payments received as prescribed by
Revenue Ruling 69-74.' Applying the provisions of Revenue Ruling 69-74,
the Commissioner found that decedent and his wife realized an imme-
diate capital gain on the transfer of the property and as the annuity
payments were received they were required to recognize that gain on a
of the attached debt far exceeded the plaintiff's claim, there was no need to decide that
question.
42. See 483 F.2d at 349 n.26. The instant case was instituted in Mississippi in order to
take advantage of a longer statute of limitations. Id.
1. 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 43 [hereinafter referred to as Revenue Ruling 69-74] in pertinent
parts provides as follows:
(1) The gain realized on the transaction is determined by comparing the trans-
feror's basis in the property with the present value of the annuity ....
(3) The gain should be reported ratably over the period of years measured by
the annuitant's life expectancy and only from that portion of the annual proceeds
which is includable in gross income by virtue of the application of section 72 of the
1954 Code . ...
(4) The investment in the contract for purposes of section 72 of the 1954 Code
is the transferor's basis in the property transferred . ...
After the capital gain ... has been fully reported, subsequent amounts received
(after applying the exclusion ratio) are to be reported as ordinary income.
1974]
